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There	are	few	good	solutions	from	a	divided	Cyprus
for	Northern	Ireland
The	Good	Friday	agreement	put	to	rest	age-old	conflicts	in	Ireland.	It	also	offered	hope	that	the
reunification	of	Cyprus	might	be	possible	within	the	European	Union.	But	lately,	as	Stavros	Zenios
writes,	the	“Green	Line”	that	divides	the	easternmost	island	of	the	EU	is	viewed	as	a	template	for	a
soft	border	at	the	westernmost	island	of	the	Union	after	Brexit.
European	nations	can	sure	find	better	ways	to	resolve	political	questions	than	turning	for	answers	to
the	last	divided	capital	of	Europe.	The	Green	Line	is	a	war	zone,	and	I	was	once	stopped	by	UN
peacekeeping	troops	when	I	inadvertently	rode	my	bicycle	into	the	demilitarised	buffer	zone	behind	the	University
campus.	It	is	hard	to	see	the	Green	Line	delivering	what	Northern	Ireland	needs.
Nevertheless,	this	template	is	being	discussed.	The	UK	Government	position	paper	refers	to	Cyprus	as	an
example.		A	working	paper	from	the	Brexit	Policy	Institute	“points	to	the	Cyprus	model”	for	the	“free	movement	of
goods”.	Nikos	Scoutaris	of	the	European	University	Institute	suggests	that	the	legal	arrangements
accommodating	the	Cyprus	situation	could	offer	some	inspiration	if	Northern	Ireland	(and	Scotland)	wish
to	remain	in	the	EU.	On	the	other	hand,	Michel	Barnier,	the	EU	chief	negotiator,	suggests	that	the	solution	for	the
border	between	Northern	Ireland	and	Ireland	cannot	“be	based	on	a	precedent”.
In	this	blog,	I	review	the	desideratum	of	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Green	Line	arrangements,	and
explain	why	these	arrangements	cannot	work	for	Northern	Ireland.	I	point	out	two	significant	asymmetries
between	the	two	islands.		While	the	Cyprus	experience	has	something	to	offer,	it	does	not	provide	a	template,	nor
should	it.
The	desideratum	of	Northern	Ireland
The	Prime	Minister’s	Article	50	letter	articulates	the	UK	position:
We	must	pay	attention	to	the	UK’s	unique	relationship	with	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	the	importance
of	the	peace	process	in	Northern	Ireland.		The	Republic	of	Ireland	is	the	only	EU	Member	State	with	a
land	border	with	the	United	Kingdom.	We	want	to	avoid	a	return	to	a	hard	border	between	our	two
countries	[…]
This	deference	to	the	status	quo	is	most	likely	welcome	by	all	actors.	However,	unilateral	flexibility	is	insufficient.
The	border	will	be	subject	to	EU	regulations	on	the	one	side	and	UK	regulations	on	the	other.	An	agreed
reciprocal	arrangement	is	needed	to	ensure	that	the	border	is	as	seamless	and	frictionless	as	possible.	That’s
where	the	Green	Line	enters	the	discussion.
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Green	Line	flexibility
While	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	territory	covers	the	whole	island,	the	northern	part	is	under	Turkish	military	control
since	the	events	of	1974.	When	the	country	joined	the	EU	in	May	2004,	the	application	of	the	acquis	was
suspended	in	the	areas	where	the	Government	does	not	exercise	effective	control.		The	Green	Line	separating
the	north	dates	to	the	hostilities	between	the	Greek-Cypriot	and	Turkish-Cypriot	communities	in	1964,	when	a
British	officer	marked	with	a	green	pencil	the	cease-fire	line	through	the	capital	city	of	Nicosia.	With	the	advance
of	the	Turkish	army	in	August	1974,	the	line	was	extended	180Km	from	the	west	to	the	east	coast,	with	a	buffer
zone	patrolled	by	UN	Blue	Berets.	The	Green	Line	is	not	considered	as	an	external	border	of	the	EU,	and	Council
Regulation	866/2004	defines	the	terms	under	which	provisions	of	EU	laws	apply	to	the	movement	of	goods	and
persons.	This	is	known	as	the	Green	Line	regulation.
The	Regulation	adopts	“special	rules	concerning	the	crossing	of	goods,	services	and	persons,	the	prime
responsibility	for	which	belongs	to	the	Republic	of	Cyprus.		As	these	areas	are	temporarily	outside	the	customs
and	fiscal	territory	of	the	Community	and	outside	the	area	of	freedom,	justice	and	security,	the	special	rules
should	secure	an	equivalent	standard	of	protection	of	the	security	of	the	EU	with	regard	to	illegal	immigration	and
threats	to	public	order,	and	of	its	economic	interests	as	far	as	the	movement	of	goods	is	concerned.	“The
Government	is	required	to	“carry	out	checks	on	all	persons	crossing	the	line	with	the	aim	to	combat	illegal
immigration”.
These	excerpts	present	the	hard	side	of	the	Regulation.	There	is	a	kinder,	gentler,	side	that	encourages	trade
between	the	north	and	the	areas	where	the	Government	exercises	effective	control.	Goods	validated	by	the
Turkish-Cypriot	Chamber	of	Commerce	as	originating	at	the	north	can	cross	freely	the	line.	It	is	this	flexible
provision	that	inspires	potential	arrangements	for	Northern	Ireland.
Regarding	persons,	EU	citizens	and	third-country	nationals	who	are	legally	residing	in	the	northern	part	of	Cyprus
can	cross	the	line.	So	does	anybody	who	enters	the	island	through	the	Government	controlled	areas.	But	what
happens	to	those	entering	the	northern	part	of	the	island	through	Turkey?	The	Regulation	states	that	“while	taking
into	account	the	legitimate	concerns	of	the	Government	of	the	Republic	of	Cyprus,	it	is	necessary	to	enable	EU
citizens	to	exercise	their	rights	of	free	movement	within	the	EU	and	set	the	minimum	rules	for	carrying	out	checks
on	persons	at	the	line	and	to	ensure	the	effective	surveillance	of	it,	in	order	to	combat	the	illegal	immigration	as
well	as	any	threat	to	public	security	and	public	policy.”
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This	masterpiece	wording	of	creative	ambiguity.	EU	citizens	who	enter	the	island	through	the	north	can	cross	the
Green	Line	by	showing	an	ID	card	or	passport.	Third	country	nationals	are,	in	general,	denied	entry.		Why	this
distinction?	EU	residents	can	enter	freely	the	island,	and	the	fact	that	they	may	have	arrived	through	Turkey	is	not
used	against	them.	Third	country	nationals	need	to	obtain	an	appropriate	visa	and	have	it	checked	at	a	legitimate
port	of	entry.		The	Government	does	not	wish	to	relegate	control	of	its	borders	at	Green	Line	crossing	points.
The	Regulation	asks	“the	Commission	shall	report	to	the	Council	on	an	annual	basis	[…]	on	the	implementation	of
the	Regulation	and	the	situation	resulting	from	its	application”.		From	these	reports,	we	can	monitor	the
experience	over	the	last	14	years	(Figure	1).
Figure	1.	Illegal	immigration	and	smuggling	across	the	Green	Line,	and	the	crossing	of	persons	across
the	Green	Line	and	the	Ireland-North	Ireland	border.
Note:	Data	for	illegal	immigration,	seized	products,		and	crossings	of	persons	across	the	Green	Line	from	Commission	reports.
Crossings	in	Ireland	for	2006	from	the	Centre	for	Cross	Border	Studies	and	for	2017	from	FactCheckN.	and	linearly	interpolated
in	between.
The	Green	Line	is	not	so	green
While	flexible,	the	Green	Line	is	far	from	being	the	soft	border	required	for	Northern	Ireland.			There	is	a	small
number	of	“official	crossing	points”	where	Republic	of	Cyprus	police	enforces	the	Green	Line	regulation.	Similarly,
Turkish-Cypriot	“authorities”	—the	“Turkish	Republic	of	Northern	Cyprus”	unilaterally	declared	its	independence	in
1983,	but	is	recognised	only	by	Turkey—	exercise,	in	general,	symmetric	controls	for	persons	and	goods	crossing
from	the	Republic	controlled	territories.
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Why	is	a	hard	border	unavoidable?	Leaving	aside	the	complexity	of	the	military	conflict	with	Turkey,	one
significant	goal	is	to	stem	illegal	immigration	from	the	north.	Even	with	strict	police	controls	and	fenced	up	the
buffer	zone	and	military	patrols	across	the	line,	there	has	been	significant	leakage.		The	number	of	irregular
migrants	is	reported	in	Figure	1.	While	illegal	crossings	are	less	than	0.5%	of	the	legal	crossings,	the	leakage	is
significant	for	an	island	with	a	population	about	1	million.	To	put	these	numbers	in	perspective,	Cyprus	was	slated
to	receive	a	maximum	of	300	Syrian	refugees,	and	the	illegal	immigration	across	the	Green	Line	is	more	than	five
times	this	quota.
The	official	crossing	points	also	serve	for	verifying	that	goods	transported	are	produced	in	northern	Cyprus	and
can	be	traded	without	duties.	Turkey,	that	enjoys	free	trade	with	the	north	of	Cyprus	but	is	not	EU	member,
cannot	export	its	products	to	the	EU	through	the	Green	Line.		However,	smuggling	of	goods	remains	widespread.
The	reports	of	the	Commission	reveal	very	little	trade	across	the	Green	Line	(4–5mil	EUR	per	annum),	but	also
seizures	of	smuggled	goods	(Figure	1).			A	report	by	Sapienta	Economics	reveals	much	higher	consumer
spending	(33.5mil.		EUR	in	2016),	which	is	about	.15%	of	the	combined	GDP	of	the	economies	on	both	sides	of
the	divide.		Smuggling	is	mainly	due	to	price	differentials	and	the	higher	tax	on	tobacco	products	in	the	Republic
of	Cyprus.	There	is	also	smuggling	of	agricultural	and	animal	and	dairy	products,	and	products
violating	intellectual	property	rights.	All	trade	is	intra-island.
The	Green	Line	model	for	Ireland
The	flexible	arrangements	of	the	Green		Line	for	the	movement	of	goods,	prompted	the		Brexit	Policy	Institute	to
propose	empowering	the	Northern	Ireland	Executive	to	identify	goods	as	originating	in	Northern	Ireland		(and	not
simply	travelling	through		Northern	Ireland	from	the	UK	or	a	third	country).	The	EU	could	allow	these	certified
goods	to	enter	the	EU	market	via	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	to	be	treated	as	EU	goods.		This	arrangement	could
indeed	work,	although	certificates	would	need	to	be	checked	at	“official	crossing	points”.
How	would	the	UK	reciprocate?	According	to	the	Brexit	Policy	Institute:
The		UK		could	allow	such		[certified]		goods	enter	the	UK	market	as	“domestic	goods”,	and	this	would	allow	the
UK	to	present	this	arrangement	as	a	symmetrical	one.
This	is	hardly	a	reciprocal	arrangement	with	the	EU,	it	is	more	like	eating	your	cake	and	having	it	too.	A
reciprocal	arrangement	will	require	products	originating	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland	to	cross	freely	into
Northern	Ireland	and	the	UK.	And	this	raises	some	hard	questions:
1.	 Could	the	Northern	Ireland	Executive	discriminate	against	products	not	produced	in	Northern	Ireland,
according	to	UK	law?		Possibly	yes,	and	the	Executive	will	be	willing	to	do	it	to	promote	Northern	Ireland
exports	to	EU	markets.
2.	 Could	the	Republic	of	Ireland	discriminate	against	products	originating	in	other	EU	member	states?	Most
likely	not,	and	the	Government	would	rather	be	unwilling	to	make	special	efforts	for	a	small	trading	partner.
A	practical	reciprocal	arrangement	would	be	to	treat	all	EU	products	entering	Northern	Ireland	from	the		Republic
of	Ireland	as	domestic	goods.	But	such	an	arrangement	will	be	a	back	door	entry	for	EU	products	into	the	UK.
Furthermore,	if	the	UK	wishes	to	“take	back	control	of	its	borders”,		as	one	of	the	objectives	of	Brexit,	it	cannot
avoid	the	hard	feature	of	the	Green		Line	when	dealing	with	crossings	of
persons.	Only	an	agreed	reciprocal	arrangement	that	anyone	in	the	Republic	of	Ireland	can	cross	into	Northern
Ireland,	and	conversely,	will	render	a	hard	border	unnecessary.	But	such	an	agreement	will	be	a	back	door	entry
of	EU	citizens	into	the	UK.
If	anybody	harbours	hope	that	the	Green	Line	template	could	still	serve	Northern	Ireland,	let	us	not	forget	the
scale	differences	between	the	two	islands.	Crossings	of	persons	and	goods	across	Northern	Ireland-Ireland
border	is	an	order	of	magnitude	bigger	than	crossings	across	the	Green	Line.
Table	1.
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Note:	Data	on	Northern	Ireland	trade	with	the		Republic	of	Ireland	from	Bruegel	and	authors	calculations.	Trade	and	persons
crossing	the	Green	Line	using	data	from	the	Commission	report	for	2016	and	authors	calculations.	Persons	crossing	the	Irish
border	from	FactCheckNI.
Asymmetries	between	the	cases	of	Northern	Ireland	and	Cyprus
Some	aspects	of	the	Green	Line	regulation	relating	to	goods	could	indeed	provide	inspiration	for	a	Northern
Ireland	border	post-Brexit.	However,	such	arrangements	require	official	crossing	points,	which	everybody	agrees
should	be	avoided	in	Northern	Ireland.	This	salient	point	is	conspicuously	absent	when	the	Green	Line	is	invoked
as	a	model.
There	are	two	significant	asymmetries	between	the	cases	of	Northern	Ireland	and	Cyprus.	These	are	worth
bearing	in	mind,	as	they	delineate	what	the	Green	Line	template	could	and	could	not	achieve.
First,	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	is	a	member	of	the	EU	and	the	Green	Line	regulation	allows	part	of	its	territory	not
under		Government	control	to	enjoy	membership	benefits.	The	interlocutor	of	the	EU	is	a	member	state.			In	the
case	of	Northern	Ireland,		arrangements	are	sought	for	a	territory	that	will	be	under	the	control	of	a	non-member
state	(UK).	There	will	be	no	member	state	interlocutor,	and	the	EU	will	have	to	deal	with	a	region.	The	case	of
Cyprus	is	easier	in	this	respect.
Second,	north	Cyprus	does	not	have	officially	recognized	State	authorities.	Arrangements	that	require	a
sovereign	—such	as	customs	control,		issuance	of	drivers	licenses,	and	vehicle	roadworthiness	certificates—
	can	not	be	worked	out	between	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	and	the	north.				The	situation	between	the	UK	and
Northern	Ireland,	and	the	Republic	of	Ireland	is	easier	in	this	respect.
Setting	a	good	example
Where	does	this	discussion	lead	us?	The	hope	that	Green	Line	can	be	a	role	model	is,	in	our	opinion,	misplaced.
No	country	divided	by	force,	and	staying	divided	for	43	years,	can	be	a	role	model.	The	Green	Line	is	an	example
of	exceptionalism	that	needs	to	be	normalized,	not	to	become	the	norm.	There	may	be	consensus	on	the
desiderata	for	Northern	Ireland,	but	they	cannot	be	achieved	using	the	Green	Line	model.
If	the	UK	and	the	EU	show	sufficient	imagination	to	find	a	solution,	that	could	become	a	template	for	Cyprus.	But
making	the	Green	Line	of	a	divided	Cyprus	the	template	for	Ireland	will	create	more	problems	than	it	will	solve.	It
will	be	going	backwards.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	was	originally
published	on	Bruegel	and	the	BPP.
Stavros	Zenios	is	a	Visiting	Fellow	at	Bruegel,	as	part	of	a	Marie	Curie	Fellowship.	He	is	a	professor	of	finance
and	management	science	at	University	of	Cyprus,	Adjunct	professor	at	the	Norwegian	School	of	Economics	and
Senior	Fellow	at	the	Wharton	School,	USA.
LSE Brexit: There are few good solutions from a divided Cyprus for Northern Ireland Page 5 of 5
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-11-16
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2017/11/16/there-are-few-good-from-a-divided-cyprus-for-northern-ireland/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
